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Quinean Predicativism *

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Abstract

Quine (1960) proposed that names be treated as the predicate elements of covert descriptions, expressing the property of being identical to the named individual. More recently, many theorists have proposed a predicativist view according which a referential name expresses the property of being called by that name. Whereas this Being-Called Predicativism has received much attention in the recent literature, Quinean Predicativism has not. This neglect is undeserved. In this paper, I argue, first, that close appositive constructions suggest that names can function as predicates expressing identifying properties of the sort proposed by Quine, and, second, that a predicativist analysis which extends this view to referential names overcomes some of the central objections that have been raised against Being-Called Predicativism.

1 Introduction

Proper names are paradigmatically used to refer to individuals. A natural thought is that they are suited to this task because they are singular terms that denote the very individuals speakers use them to refer to. Against this traditional referentialist view, Quine (1960) suggested that names be treated as predicates. In particular, he suggested treating a name like 'Socrates' as a predicate that expresses the condition or property of being identical to Socrates. Referential uses of names can then be analyzed as covert definite descriptions involving such identifying predicates:

> "What suggests itself is that '= Pegasus', '= mama', '= Socrates', etc. be parsed anew as indissoluble general terms, no separate recognition of singular terms 'Pegasus', 'mama', 'Socrates', etc. being needed … 'Socrates' as singular term can be defined

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as '$(\iota x)(x$ is Socrates)' on the basis of 'Socrates' as general term." (Quine, 1960, §37, §39)

The predicativist view that names function as the predicate element of a covert definite description has enjoyed a resurgence of popularity in recent years. But although contemporary predicativism bears a certain formal resemblance to Quine's proposal, the motivation for this view is quite different. These predicativists focus our attention on uses of names like the following:

(1) An Alfred Russell joined the club today.

first emphasized by Sloat (1969) and Burge (1973). Here, the name 'Alfred Russell' seems *clearly* to be functioning predicatively. Syntactically, it is the noun-phrase complement to an indefinite determiner. And semantically, it seems to express the property of being called 'Alfred Russell', with the sentence as a whole saying that some one among the individuals who have this property joined the club.[1] Predicative uses of names that express such "being-called properties" can also take plural forms, and appear in combination with a wide range of determiners. Here are some more examples from the literature:

(2) [Some Smiths] stopped by. (Sloat, 1969)

(3) [Two Ralphs] and [an Alfred] came to the party last night. (Gray, 2017)

(4) [Every Sarah I've met] sometimes works as a babysitter. (Fara, 2015)

(5) [Most Alfreds] are crazy. (Elbourne, 2005)

(6) [The Alfred who joined the club today] was a baboon. (Burge, 1973)

(7) [The designer Marc Jacobs] is opening a new store. (Fara, 2015)

Being-Called Predicativists then suggest that bare referential occurrences of names should be analyzed as fitting this mould.[2] In particular, they hold that a bare referential occurrence of a name N also expresses the property of being called N, forming the predicate element of morphologically reduced definite description with a silent definite article.

[1] For convenience of formulation, I will gloss being-called properties in metalinguistic terms, involving a mention of the relevant name. Fara (2011b, 2015), following Matushansky (2005), argues that names are *used* rather than mentioned in being-called contexts (as the predicate element of a small clause). That said, Fara (2015, fn. 26) allows that e.g. *being called Alfred* is equivalent to bearing the name 'Alfred'. At any rate, the arguments in the present paper are orthogonal to this issue, and readers should feel free to imagine away the quote marks.

[2] By "bare referential occurrences of names" (or just "referential names," as I'll often abbreviate) I mean those paradigmatic cases where names occur as arguments to verbs and are (in English) unaccompanied by any overt determiner or modifier. So 'Alfred is clever' or 'I met Alfred' exhibit bare referential occurrences, in contrast to the predicative occurrence in the examples above.

This form of Being-Called Predicativism has received a detailed formulation and defense at the hands of Fara (2015), and it is her view that I will focus on.[3] It resembles Quinean Predicativism insofar as both treat referential occurrences of names as having predicate-type semantic values, and forming the predicate element of a covert definite description. But they differ in terms of the kind of property the predicative name is held to express: being called *N* versus being identical to the named individual. Whereas Being-Called Predicativism has received a great deal of attention in the recent literature, the Quinean alternative has not. I think this neglect is undeserved.

My aim in this paper is twofold. First, I will argue that one of the predicative examples listed above is not like the rest. Fara's (2015) example (7) is an instance of a construction called *close apposition*. I shall argue that names occurring in such constructions do function as predicates, but that they are better analyzed as expressing identifying properties of the sort postulated by Quine than the being-called properties exhibited in the remaining examples (1)–(6). If this is right, and names have predicative occurrences of the identifying kind, this also opens up the possibility of an alternative predicative analysis of bare referential names. My second goal will be to explore this alternative approach to referential names. As we will see, Quinean Predicativism, according to which referential names as analyzed as covert definite descriptions incorporating the kind of identifying predicates found in close appositives, avoids a number of objections that have been raised against Being-Called Predicativism in the recent literature.

Before we begin, let me flag that the label "Quinean Predicativism" is meant loosely. Quine was not in the first instance interested in the semantics of names in English or other natural languages, let alone in close appositives, but in the project of finding a suitable regimentation of English into a canonical formal notation, with a view towards solving problems like that of true negative existentials. The label is only meant to register a family resemblance between the view I will discuss below and the one Quine articulates in the quote above, nothing more.[4]

[3]Gray (2017) argues for a similar form of Being-Called Predicativism. There are a number of other predicativist views in the literature that depart in one way or another from the Being-Called Predicativism defended by Fara (2015), and which I don't have the space to consider in detail here. First, some, like Burge (1973) and Sawyer (2010) take referential names to involve a covert demonstrative rather than a covert definite determiner. Second, there are views that join Fara in postulating a covert definite determiner, but differ with regard to the property involved. Matushansky (2008), for example, invokes contextually determined naming conventions, and holds that a referential occurrence of e.g. 'Alfred' expresses the property of bearing the contextually salient naming convention *R* to the phonological string 'Alfred' is spelled out as. Elbourne (2005), on the other hand, analyzes referential 'Alfred' in terms of the description 'the x: $x = y$ and x is called 'Alfred' ', where y is the particular Alfred referred to on a given occasion. Elbourne's view is something of a hybrid between Being-Called Predicativism and Quinean Predicativism, and I shall occasionally comment on how the points I discuss below bear on it.

[4]For an overview of the evolution of Quine's views on names, see Fara (2011a).

2 Close Appositives

I begin in this section by delineating the category of close appositives, sometimes also called *restrictive* or *integrated* appositives.[5] Take again Fara's (2015) example from above:

(7) The designer Marc Jacobs is opening a new store.

Syntactically, close appositives take the form of definite descriptions that embed a sortal noun (here 'designer') followed by a proper name (here 'Marc Jacobs'). As such, they differ from examples like the following:

(8) The Marc Jacobs who joined the club is opening a new store.

(9) The taller Marc Jacobs is opening a new store.

In (8) the name is modified by a restrictive relative clause, and in (9) by the adjective 'taller', whereas, again, in close appositives like (7) the name occurs after a sortal noun. Though there are examples like 'the person Marc Jacobs' that sound odd, close apposition is fairly productive in terms of the sortal nouns it can involve:

(10) a. The detective Sherlock Holmes
b. The author William Shakespeare
c. The philosopher Quine
d. The planet Venus
e. The year 1984

The initial noun phrase can also be complex, as in the following:

(11) a. The famous artist Frida Kahlo
b. The Greek god Poseidon

Semantically, close appositives are characterized by the intimate relationship they bear to the embedded name, which can be substituted for the description as a whole *salva veritate*. The following inference, for example, seem correct:

(12) The designer Marc Jacobs is opening a new store. So Marc Jacobs is opening a new store.

[5] On close apposition, see e.g. Burton-Roberts (1975), Jackendoff (1984), Meyer (1989), Payne and Huddleston (2002), and Acuña-Fariña (2016). There are a number of related constructions that I will not discuss here, including ones like 'the city of London' (which contains an 'of' between the name and sortal noun), 'my friend Sylvia' (which is possessive and involves a relational noun), 'Mark Jacobs the designer' (where the name occupies initial position), and 'that guy John' (which is fronted by a demonstrative). See Acuña-Fariña (2016) for various ways in which these differ from "prototypical" close appositives of the kind I focus on.

Intuitively, such inferences are correct because the close appositive as a whole designates the very same individual as the embedded name, with the sortal noun providing information about the category to which the named entity belongs.

It is important to distinguish close or restrictive appositives like these from *loose* or *non-restrictive* appositives like the following:

(13) a. The detective, Sherlock Holmes, solved the case.
b. The famous artist, Frida Kahlo, held an exhibition of her work.

Loose appositives are prosodically characterized by a pause between the initial noun phrase and the proper name, indicated by a comma. In the case of close apposition, by contrast, there is no such detachment — the sortal noun and name are pronounced as a single unit.

Jackendoff (1984) offers several diagnostics that distinguish close apposition from loose apposition. First, loose appositives allow modification of the sortal noun with a relative clause, whereas close appositives do not:

(14) a. The detective you mentioned, Sherlock Holmes, comes highly recommended.
b. *The detective you mentioned Sherlock Holmes comes highly recommended.

Second, the definite article can be replaced with an indefinite article in loose appositives but not close appositives:

(15) a. We saw (an / the) artist, Frida Kahlo, arrive at the party.
b. We saw (*an / the) artist Frida Kahlo arrive at the party.

And third, loose appositives allow superlative modification of the sortal noun, whereas close appositives do not:

(16) a. The brightest planet, Venus, appeared above the horizon.
b. * The brightest planet Venus appeared above the horizon.

Intuitively, these last two examples sound defective because close appositives are inherently definite. As Jackendoff (1984) puts it:

> The function of [a loose] appositive is to add information about an already specified individual; it can never itself be the specification by virtue of which the NP in which it occurs is definite. . . . By contrast, in [the close appositive construction] *the N-E*, [the element] *E* has the function of uniquely specifying some individual of the category named by *N*. Thus the construction is inherently definite.

Jackendoff's thought is that in a felicitous use of a loose appositive like (13a), the description 'the detective' is construed as contextually complete, singling out a unique detective, with the name between commas just serving as an added, inessential aside. By contrast, in a close appositive, the name has the semantic function of specifying which particular individual in the extension of the sortal noun is at issue, thereby rendering the description semantically complete or definite. Since the construction inherently definite, attempting to introduce it with an indefinite article, as in (15b), or adding further specification of the individual at issue via a superlative, as in (16b), sounds marked.

3 Evidence for Predicativity

Fara (2015) offers 'the designer Marc Jacobs' as an example of a predicative, or (e,t) type, occurrence of the name 'Marc Jacobs'. In light of Jackendoff's (1984) remark that the name seems to specify the individual that the description as a whole designates, one might suspect that names instead function referentially in these constructions. There are, however, several reasons that suggest Fara was right to regard names in close appositives as predicative.[6]

The first has to do with a compositional consideration. The prosodic contrast between close appositives and loose appositives suggests that in the former case, the noun 'designer' and the name 'Mark Jacobs' form a semantic and syntactic unit that then combines with the definite article. The sortal noun 'designer' is just a predicate, of type (e,t). If now the name 'Marc Jacobs' were semantically referential, it would have type e (or type $((e,t),t)$ for Montagovians). So composing it with the noun 'designer' by Functional Application would yield the saturated type t for the phrase 'designer Marc Jacobs', rendering it incapable of combining with the definite article, which requires a complement of type (e,t). We'd in other words have a type clash. By contrast, if the name occurs as a predicate, as an expression of type (e,t), it can combine with 'designer' via Heim and Kratzer's (1998) compositional principle of Predicate Modification, delivering the desired type (e,t) for the complex phrase 'designer Marc Jacobs'.

This consideration is of course not definitive. Although the predicative analysis offers a comparatively straightforward compositional story, a referential analysis could still be maintained if we postulate a covert element that somehow repairs the type mismatch, by shifting either the name or the sortal noun to an appropriately different type.[7] However, on such a view one would then expect that other, co-referential singular terms should be capable of taking the place of the allegedly referential name in a close appositive.

This brings us to a second reason to think that names in close appositives do not function

[6]The arguments in this section and the next elaborate on ones in Rieppel (2013).

[7]Proposals of this sort are put forward by Lasersohn (1986) and Saebø (2018), for example.

referentially, namely, that this distributional prediction is not borne out. If we replace the name in a close appositive with a definite description, a possessive, or a demonstrative, the result is marked:[8]

(17) a. The designer [Marc Jacobs] is opening a new store.
b. *The designer [the guy over there] is opening a new store.
c. *The designer [my neighbor] is opening a new store.
d. * The designer [that guy in the corner] is opening a new store.

Contrast loose appositives, where the name plausibly does occur referentially, and co-referential terms now can be substituted:

(18) a. The designer, [Marc Jacobs], is opening a new store.
b. The designer, [the guy over there], is opening a new store.
c. The designer, [my neighbor], is opening a new store.
d. The designer, [that guy in the corner], is opening a new store.

Or to take another example, contrast the close appositive 'the author Sir Walter Scott' with the possessive description 'the author of *Waverley*'. In the latter case, unlike the former, the noun 'author' isn't of type (e,t) but functions relationally, designating a "possession relation" between individuals and books they authored. Here the name 'Waverley' occurs referentially, contributing an argument to that relation. In this construction, other co-referential terms can again be substituted, as expected:

(19) a. The author of [*Waverley*] was born in Edinburgh.
b. The author of [the book on that shelf] was born in Edinburgh.
c. The author of [my favorite book] was born in Edinburgh.
d. The author of [that book] was born in Edinburgh.

The fact that parallel substitutions produce ungrammatical results in the close appositive 'the author Sir Walter Scott' suggests that the name does not occur referentially here.

A final consideration draws on cross-linguistic data. In certain dialects of German, including Swiss German, personal names are obligatorily preceded by an overt definite article when they occur referentially, in argument position:[9]

[8]Schiffer (2003) also makes this observation in relation to 'the Italian singer Pavarotti', noting that we can't substitute 'the greatest tenor' to obtain 'the Italian singer the greatest tenor'. Schiffer takes this to constitute a counterexample to the principle that co-referential singular terms are always substitutable. But as MacBride (2011) observes, Schiffer's example might instead be taken as evidence that the name 'Pavarotti' functions as a predicate in this construction.

[9]Though my examples are drawn from Swiss German, I will use standard German orthography for ease of presentation. Names are accompanied by overt definite articles in various languages besides German, such as Catalan, Greek,

(20) Die Sappho reiste nach Sizilien.
"Sappho travelled to Sicily."

Close appositives display the usual structure, with a sortal noun preceding the name:

(21) Die Dichterin Sappho reiste nach Sizilien.
"The poet Sappho travelled to Sicily."

Now if, in the context of the close appositive, the name 'Sappho' functioned referentially as some sort of argument, we would expect the name to be immediately preceded by a definite article, as is usual for names in argument position. Adding a definite article to the name 'Sappho' is, however, ungrammatical in this case:

(22) *Die Dichterin die Sappho reiste nach Sizilien.

Contrast this once again with a possessive description, where the name contributes an argument to the possession relation, and now is immediately preceded by a definite article:

(23) Der Vater von der Sappho ist unbekannt.
"The father of Sappho is unknown."

This again suggests that in the context of close appositives, names do not occur referentially but as predicates.

Of course, distributional considerations cut both ways, and a similar objection could be raised against the predicative analysis. If names in close appositives function as predicates, we might expect that other predicative expressions should be capable of occurring in the position of the allegedly predicative name, just as a referential treatment would lead us to expect that other singular terms should be capable of occurring in that position. In particular, we might expect other nouns to be capable of replacing the name. And yet replacing the name with a noun, as in the following:

(24) a. The artist Frida Kahlo exhibited her work.
b. *The artist painter exhibited her work.
c. *The artist woman exhibited her work.

produces results that are marked.

However, intersectively interpreted noun+noun combinations of this sort, though perhaps quite constrained, do exist.[10] Examples include 'warrior poet', 'gentleman farmer', 'woman president',

European Portuguese, Icelandic, and certain dialects of Italian, among many others. English could be argued to have some examples as well, as in e.g. 'the Mississippi', 'the Louvre', 'the Netherlands.'

[10] I say "intersectively interpreted" to flag that these seem to differ from more common examples like 'bird house'

and ‘comedian candidate’. Both of the following, for example, are acceptable:

(25) a. The comedian Zelensky gave a speech.
b. The comedian candidate gave a speech.

Indeed, Burton-Roberts (1975) has proposed that close appositives display a structure parallel to that of such noun+noun combinations, and suggests that this parallel offers “an explanation for the otherwise unaccountable restriction on so-called restrictive appositions . . . that they must contain a name” (1975, p. 401). The thought, I take it, is that the apparent restriction to names isn’t genuine, and that other nouns may occur in place of the name. In fact, as an anonymous reviewer notes, the infelicitous example (17b) from above can be rendered acceptable if the determiner on the embedded description is dropped (to hear this, it helps to place stress on ‘designer’):

(26) The designer guy over there is opening a new store.

This seems to involve a noun+noun combination ‘designer guy’ similar to ‘comedian candidate’ or ‘woman president’. So although substituting a definite description or other singular term into the position of a name in a close appositive, as in the original example (17b), produces an infelicitous result, the acceptability of (26) again suggests that nouns can occur in that position. It is also noteworthy that modifying the initial noun in one of these noun+noun constructions with a relative clause sounds terrible:

(27) a. *The comedian you mentioned candidate gave a speech.
b. *The designer you mentioned guy over there is opening a new store.

paralleling the infelicity that results from modifying the sortal noun in a close appositive with a relative clause, as we observed at the hand of (14) above. This lends support to the conjecture that there is indeed a structural parallel between the two constructions, and thus to the view that names in close appositives function predicatively.

Admittedly, there are also some differences between close appositives and these intersective noun+noun constructions. For example, ‘the former comedian candidate’ is more naturally understood to designate someone who was formerly a comedian candidate than someone who was formerly a comedian and now a candidate (though the latter reading is available too, with the right stress). On the other hand, ‘the former comedian Zelensky’ is naturally understood to designate someone who was formerly a comedian, but is still Zelensky. Second, as noted by Acuña-Fariña (2016), the stress in a close appositive by default falls on the name rather than the sortal noun. By contrast, example (26), as already noted, sounds best if stress is intentionally placed on the initial

or ‘university library’, where the designated entities do not belong in the extension of both nouns.

noun ‘designer’. Still, the existence of such intersective noun+noun constructions suggest that the predicative analysis of names in close appositives may have an answer to the distributional concern. On balance, there seems to be sufficient evidence to favor of the predicative analysis that we may adopt it moving forward.

4 Against the Being-Called Analysis

Although Fara (2015) appears to have been right to regard ‘the designer Marc Jacobs’ as involving a predicative name, I now want to argue that such occurrences of names are not well-analyzed in terms of being-called predicates, but should instead be subject to a Quinean Analysis, according to which these names express identifying properties.

Take the the close appositive ‘the philosopher Russell’ in a context where it is used to refer to Bertrand Russell. The two competing proposals offer the following semantics for the name ‘Russell’ as it occurs in this construction:[11]

Being-Called Analysis: $[\![\text{Russell}]\!] = \lambda x.\ x$ is called ‘Russell’

Quinean Analysis: $[\![\text{Russell}]\!] = \lambda x.\ x = \text{Russell}$

In line with the compositional consideration mentioned earlier, I shall take it that in our close appositive the noun ‘philosopher’ combines with the name ‘Russell’ intersectively, via the compositional rule of Predicate Modification. The compound predicate ‘philosopher Russell’ that occurs as the complement to the definite article — or the “appositive complement,” as I’ll sometimes call it — is then predicted to have the following semantic values on the two views:

Being-Called Analysis: $[\![\text{philosopher Russell}]\!] = \lambda x.\ x$ is a philosopher $\wedge$ x is called ‘Russell’

Quinean Analysis: $[\![\text{philosopher Russell}]\!] = \lambda x.\ x$ is a philosopher $\wedge\ x = \text{Russell}$

The crucial difference is that ‘philosopher Russell’ is predicted to be *multiply satisfiable* on the Being-Called Analysis. After all, there are many philosophers called ‘Russell’. Thus the description ‘the philosopher Russell’ is predicted to be an incomplete description, similar to ‘the philosopher’ or ‘the book’ which also embed multiply satisfiable predicates. By contrast, on the Quinean

[11] When presenting this material, I have sometimes gotten the complaint that the semantic value given on behalf of the Quinean is illegitimate because it is specified using a name that isn’t predicative (since it occurs in the argument position of the identity symbol). But note first that the Quinean Predicativist isn’t denying that names in English can occur referentially, in argument position, just proposing a certain analysis of such occurrences (as covert descriptions involving a predicative name, see section 6 below). This analysis could then also be applied to referential occurrences of names in the the semantic metalanguage, if one wished. An alternative option would be to point out that the character of the metalanguage is up for stipulation, and that we could therefore introduce names that are stipulated to be type e into our metalanguage, and use them to specify semantic values for predicative, (e,t) type Quinean names in the object language.

Analysis the appositive complement is semantically guaranteed to be uniquely satisfiable, since there is only one philosopher identical to Bertrand Russell. Thus the description 'the philosopher Russell' is predicted to be complete, similar to 'the tallest philosopher' or 'the first book I read' which also embed uniquely satisfiable predicates. This difference between the two views bears on two of the diagnostics by which Jackendoff (1984) distinguished close from loose appositives.

4.1 Superlatives

First, recall that close appositives do not admit superlative modifiers:

(28) *I saw the tallest philosopher Russell at the meeting.

This datum is unexpected on the Being-Called Analysis. Incomplete descriptions, like 'the philosopher' or 'the book', do in general allow for superlative modification:

(29) a. The tallest philosopher attended the meeting.
b. The biggest book went missing.

This is of course to be expected: incomplete descriptions embed multiply satisfiable predicates, and we can then modify them with a superlative, making the predicate uniquely satisfiable and rendering the description as a whole semantically complete.

Or to take another example, consider the description 'the Russell from Cambridge', which seems to involve a being-called use of the name — the description intuitively designates that individual among those called 'Russell' who is from Cambridge. The embedded predicate is again multiply satisfiable (there could be more than one individual from Cambridge called 'Russell'), and superlative modification is again unproblematic:

(30) I saw the tallest Russell from Cambridge at the meeting.

The fact that close appositives do not admit this kind of superlative modification tells against the Being-Called Analysis of this construction.

The Quinean Analysis, on the other hand, is compatible with this datum about superlatives. Recall Jackendoff's observation that in a close appositive like 'the philosopher Russell', the name seems to uniquely specify who among the category of philosophers is at issue. The Quinean Analysis captures that intuition, since the name 'Russell' is held to denote an identifying property that's only had by Russell, which then renders the appositive complement 'philosopher Russell' uniquely satisfiable. Superlatives have a similar function, specifying which individual in a given class the speaker means to refer to — the *tallest* among the philosophers, or the *biggest* among the books

— which in turn renders the relevant predicate uniquely satisfiable. It then isn't surprising that an attempt to "double up" on this task would lead to infelicity: if 'philosopher Russell' is already uniquely satisfiable, one can't make it more specific by adding a superlative. By way of comparison, consider the following:

(31) a. The first big book I read went missing.
b. The biggest book I read went missing.
c. * The first biggest book I read went missing.

The multiply satisfiable predicate 'big book I read' can be rendered uniquely satisfiable via an ordinal, as (31a), or via a superlative, as in (31b), but doubling up, as in (31c), leads to infelicity. The Quinean Analysis can explain the infelicity of superlative modification of close appositives as an instance of this more general phenomenon.

4.2 Indefinites

Another of Jackendoff's (1984) diagnostics is that close appositives do not allow for the definite article to be replaced with an indefinite article:[12]

(32) I saw (*a / the) philosopher Russell at the meeting.

This is again unexpected on the Being-Called analysis. Incomplete descriptions do in general allow the definite article to be replaced by an indefinite article:[13]

(33) I saw (a / the) philosopher at the meeting.

(34) (A / The) book went missing.

This is as one would expect: since incomplete descriptions involve a multiply satisfiable predicate,

[12] Jackendoff (1984) draws attention to the indefinite article, but other non-definite determiners would do as well: 'every philosopher Russell' or 'no philosopher Russell' also sound defective. That close appositives do not admit an indefinite article is also noted by Burton-Roberts (1975) and Acuña-Fariña (2016). Marcus Rossberg has pointed out to me that there are examples where indefinite articles sound fine (imagine e.g. a receptionist at an office saying these):

(i) a. A doctor Anna Bailey stopped by to see you.
b. A detective Poirot left a message for you.

However, in such examples, the noun seems to function as a mere title. To force the kind of reading at issue in close appositives, it helps to modify the noun, as in e.g. 'the distinguished Belgian detective Poirot.' An indefinite article now again sounds quite bad to my ear in comparison with the definite.

[13] Indeed, the indefinite sounds a bit better in these examples. Incomplete definite descriptions generally incorporate a "familiarity condition," so for the definite examples, it helps to imagine a context where a particular philosopher or book was previously mentioned.

that predicate should combine freely with the indefinite article. The theoretical challenge is to explain how such a predicate can combine with the *definite* article despite the absence of a unique satisfier.

Similarly, consider again the description 'the Russell from Cambridge', which plausibly does involve a being-called used of the name. Here, the indefinite is once more unproblematic:

(35) I saw (a / the) Russell from Cambridge at the meeting.

The fact that close appositives do not admit substitution of an indefinite article again tells against the view that the name in 'the philosopher Russell' is interpreted as denoting the being-called property that it denotes in descriptions like 'the Russell from Cambridge'.

The Quinean Analysis, on the other hand, does not face this problem. Semantically complete definite descriptions, which embed uniquely satisfiable predicates, do not allow the definite article to be replaced by an indefinite:

(36) I saw (*a / the) tallest philosopher at the meeting.

(37) (*A / The) first book I read went missing.

Since the Quinean Analysis treats close appositives as another variety of semantically complete descriptions, it can again explain Jackendoff's diagnostic as an instance of a more general phenomenon.[14]

5 Identifying Properties and Indefinites

Before moving on to referential names, I want to touch on another point to do with indefinites and identifying properties of the sort the Quinean employs. It has often been observed that indefinites sometimes behave like referential expressions. For example:

(38) If a relative of mine died in the fire, I'll inherit a fortune.

This has a reading on which it isn't the dying of just any relative of mine that will secure me a fortune; rather, the inheritance is contingent on the death of a particular individual, say Tom. This reading can't be a matter of the indefinite taking scope over the conditional, since antecedents of conditionals are scope islands (and wide-scoping threatens to deliver truth-conditions that are

[14]Elbourne's (2005) hybrid view (see footnote 3) arguably faces a version of this problem. Although Elbourne analyzes referential names in terms of both an identifying property and a being-called property, the identifying property is not contributed by the name itself, but as a separate covert argument to the definite article. Since the name itself just expresses a being-called property on his view, one would expect the compound predicate "philosopher Russell" to be multiply satisfiable, and thus to allow for an indefinite article.

too weak). One might therefore be tempted to conclude that indefinites are ambiguous between an existentially quantified reading, and a referential reading on which 'a relative of mine' simply refers to Tom.

Against the ambiguity-view, Schwarzschild (2002) proposed that the apparently referential behavior of such "specific indefinites" is instead due to an additional covert restriction on the predicate (here 'relative of mine'), in combination with which the extension of the restrictor predicate as a whole is reduced to a singleton set (here one containing just Tom). This secures the relevant reading while retaining a uniform existential semantics. But now, couldn't the contribution of the additional covert restrictor just be an identifying property, like that of being identical to Tom? Hawthorne and Manley (2012) make just that suggestion, proposing that in the case of an assertion of 'a certain person is unhappy' by a speaker who means to say something specifically about Mary, "the covert element might provide the property of *being identical to Mary*, while the overt element provides the property of *being a person*, and together they yield the conjunction of these properties as the singleton restrictor" (Hawthorne and Manley, 2012, p. 133). They go on to extend this proposal from indefinites to incomplete definite descriptions, suggesting that these too may often be rendered complete by covert "singular restrictors" of this sort.[15]

In one sense, this view is congenial to the Quinean Analysis of close appositives. From this perspective, names in close appositives can be regarded as overt singular restrictors of the kind that are sometimes covertly operative in specific indefinites and incomplete definite descriptions. Just like their covert counterparts, they combine with a multiply satisfiable predicate to produce a uniquely satisfied singleton restrictor. Viewed in another light, however, one might worry that this proposal about specific indefinites poses a problem for the Quinean Analysis, or rather, for one of the arguments in its favor given in the previous section. For specific indefinites are, after all, still *indefinites*, i.e. headed by an indefinite article. And this despite sometimes involving singular, and thus uniquely satisfiable, restrictors. It therefore looks like the unique satisfiability of appositive complements cannot be appealed to in order to explain why these do not allow an indefinite article, as I did above in support of the Quinean Analysis.

This point can be addressed, however, and may in the end even further support to the Quinean Analysis. A hallmark of specific indefinites, noted by many commentators including both Schwarzschild (2002) and Hawthorne and Manley (2012), is that the hearer is usually presumed not not know which individual the speaker is referring to via her use of the indefinite. To use Hawthorne and

[15]Both Schwarzschild (2002) and Hawthorne and Manley (2012, §4.5) do not commit themselves on whether covert restrictors are realized syntactically via unvoiced pronominal elements, or whether they enter the compositional process by some other means. I will here follow them in this regard. The same goes for my discussion of covert determiners in the next section: I will generally speak as if covert definite determiners on bare names are syntactically realized at LF, as suggested by Fara (2015), but the Quinean proposal seems to me in principle compatible with regarding the determiner as entering the compositional process by other means.

Manley's (2012, §4.9) terminology, the restrictor in a specific indefinite is ordinarily *coy* rather than *candid*, meaning that the hearer isn't in a position to identify the individual at issue except parasitically, as "whichever individual the speaker meant." In a felicitous use of (38), for example, one imagines a hearer who isn't familiar with Tom, and can only identify the relative in question in terms that are parasitic in this way on the very utterance at issue.

By contrast, definite descriptions, Hawthorne and Manley suggest, generally require *candid* restrictors that give hearers a non-parasitic means of identifying the individual at issue. Candidness can be secured either covertly or overtly. In the covert case, candidness can be achieved by implicitly invoking a restrictor that is contextually salient to both the speaker and hearer. For example, whereas it is not felicitous to assert 'the dog was cute' out of the blue, one can assert this if it follows an utterance of 'I saw a dog on my way home'. In that case, the hearer is able to supply the implicit restriction to identify the unique dog at issue, thus satisfying candidness. Alternatively, and more simply, candidness can be achieved by using a description that is overtly complete, that is, one whose overt restrictor predicate is already uniquely satisfied and thus directly gives the hearer a non-parasitic means of identifying the individual. Predicates involving superlatives would be paradigmatic example of this. And as we noted above, and Hawthorne and Manley likewise point out, restrictors that are overtly candid in this way are generally unable to combine with an indefinite article, since "the choice not to use a definite would misleadingly suggest that the description is not candidly restricted" (Hawthorne and Manley, 2012, p. 160).

The fact that close appositives do not allow an indefinite article to replace the definite article can therefore be taken as evidence that they too are *overtly candid*, just like descriptions with superlatives. And this is of course precisely what the Quinean Analysis maintains: that the name expresses an identifying property which renders the appositive complement uniquely satisfiable, and thus overtly candid. Singular restrictors on specific indefinites therefore don't undermine the Quinean Analysis of close appositives, but give it indirect support.

6 Bare Referential Names

I have so far argued that names occurring in close appositives are predicates, but that they are better analyzed as predicates of the Quinean identifying kind than of the being-called kind. But if names express identifying properties in some of their occurrences, this then also opens up the possibility of an alternative predicative analysis of bare referential names. Rather than assimilate these occurrences to being-called predicates, we might instead construe bare referential names on the model of names in close appositives.

According to this Quinean form of predicativism, bare referential names also express identifying properties, and have an underlying structure much like close appositives, except that the

intervening sortal noun drops away, and the definite article is realized covertly. A bare referential occurrence of 'Quine', for example, functions as the predicate element of a covert description along the lines of *the x such that x = Quine*. The underlying structure of the bare 'Quine' thus resembles that of a close appositive like 'the philosopher Quine', except that it lacks a sortal noun and the definite article remains covert. At least it does in English. In languages like Swiss German, where referential names are accompanied by an overt definite article, the only difference between referential names and close appositives consists in the omission of the intervening sortal noun.[16] As we'll see next, this analysis in fact enjoys advantages when it comes to several objections that have been raised against Being-Called Predicativism in the recent literature.

6.1 Rigidity

Perhaps the most obvious challenge faced by Being-Called Predicativism is how to explain the default rigidity of bare referential names, given that definite descriptions in general are not rigid. In particular, a description of the form *the x such that x is called N*, which Being-Called Predicativists put forward as their analysis of the bare referential N, seems like it won't be rigid given that an individual called N might have been called something else.

Fara (2015) is of course aware of this challenge, and offers a reply. First, she points out that, according to Being-Called Predicativism, bare names will constitute a variety of incomplete descriptions, since the property of being called N is, as we've also noted, multiply satisfiable. Second, she puts forward the *the rigidity thesis*, that incomplete descriptions are (in contrast to complete ones) in general rigid. She doesn't regard it as incumbent on her to explain why this is so: the Being-Called Predicativist can simply "piggyback" on whatever it is that ultimately accounts for the rigidity of incomplete descriptions to secure the rigidity of names.

Schoubye (2018, 2017) offers several objections to this proposal, however. First, consider an unusual name, like 'Barack Obama', and suppose that there is only one person who is called 'Barack Obama'. Such a name, Schoubye (2018) reasons, would then not be incomplete according to Being-Called Predicativism, and yet it would still be rigid. So piggy-backing on incomplete descriptions won't cover all the cases. The Being-Called Predicativist might reply that a description should count as incomplete as long as the predicate is multiply satisfi*able*, even if it is, as a matter of contingent fact, uniquely satisfied. But this will now make the notion of incompleteness too expansive for the rigidity thesis to hold. 'The author of *Waverley*', for example, involves a multiply satisfiable predicate (the book could have been co-authored), and yet the description is non-rigid.

[16] Chierchia (2010, p. 137) also proposes to analyze names in such languages in the Quinean manner. For a different view see Longobardi (1994) and Lekakou and Szendröi (2012), who argue that the definite article in such languages is expletive, or semantically vacuous (a view that would go naturally with a referentialist analysis of such names). A version of Being-Called Predicativism has been defended for such languages by Matushansky (2006, 2008).

Perhaps, then, the rigidity thesis should just be stated in terms of a narrower category: not incomplete descriptions in general, but descriptions that involve a single, unmodified count-noun, like the examples of 'the book' and 'the table' to which Fara appeals.

A second point pressed by Schoubye (2018, 2017) calls this reformulated thesis into question as well, however. Consider an example like the following put forward in the course of deliberating a furniture purchase:

(39) The table should be durable and scratch-resistant.

Here the unmodified count-noun description 'the table' exhibits what Rothschild (2007) terms a *role-type* reading: there are a range of possible circumstances at issue (different decisions about which table to buy), with the descriptions picking out different tables across these different situations. So it looks like unmodified-count-noun descriptions allow for non-rigid readings after all, belying even the modified rigidity thesis. Further epicycles are possible in this dialectic, as discussed by Schoubye (2017). But suffice it to say, accounting for the default rigidity of referential names remains a challenge for the Being-Called Predicativism.

Contrast Quinean Predicativism. Here the rigidity problem simply doesn't arise in the first place. Whereas the property of being called 'Quine' is one that Quine only has contingently, the property of being identical to Quine is a necessary property of his. Since Quinean Predicativism appeals to such identifying properties, it predicts that a referential name rigidly designates the same individual across possible circumstances. The default rigidity of names is therefore immediately captured.[17]

6.2 Attributively Distributed Descriptions

A second, closely related worry about Being-Called Predicativism concerns what Schoubye (2017) calls "attributively distributed descriptions." Unmodified-count-noun descriptions can appear under quantifiers, and then function non-rigidly, varying in denotation with respect to the range of individuals introduced by the quantifier. For example:

(40) Every professor in the country made the dean grade the exams.

[17] Names are sometimes claimed to be rigid in the even stronger sense of denoting the same individual at any given world, period, even if that individual does not exist in that world. Whether Quinean Predicativism secures such "obstinate" rigidity will inter-alia depend on whether one thinks an individual i has the property of being identical to i even at worlds where i does not exist, and the kind of semantics one gives for the definite article. Letting α be an obstinate designator of i, Salmon (1981, §3), for example, regards $\ulcorner x = \alpha \urcorner$ as true at *every* world under an assignment of i to 'x', but still holds that $\ulcorner \iota x(x = \alpha) \urcorner$ fails to denote anything with respect to worlds where i does not exist. One could however use a different semantics for the ι-operator so that whether $\ulcorner \iota x(x = \alpha) \urcorner$ denotes with respect to a world w depends only on wether there is a unique individual under an assignment of which to 'x', $\ulcorner x = \alpha \urcorner$ is true at w .

This sentence is naturally interpreted so that the description 'the dean' picks out different individuals relative to the different professors introduced by the quantifier.

Now if bare names are just another variety of unmodified-count-noun description, involving a being-called predicate, one would expect them to display the same attributive readings. But as Schoubye (2017) points out, a parallel example with a bare name in place of 'the dean':

(41) Every professor in the country made Jack grade the exams.

does not appear to have a reading on which the name is interpreted attributively, picking out different Jacks with respect to different professors. The name seems to rigidly refer to Jack. Indeed, even if it is stipulated as a matter of common ground that every university employs an individual called 'Jack', the attribute reading still seems not to be forthcoming. Contrast this with a case like the following, where the name expresses a being-called property and the distributive reading is available:

(42) Every professor in the country made the Jack from the dean's office grade the exams.

That bare names do not exhibit such a reading is once again unexpected given Being-Called Predicativism.

The Quinean Predicativist, by contrast, has a ready explanation for this phenomenon, for the same reasons as before. Again, on the Quinean view, referential names denote identifying properties. Since there can't be a variety of *different* individuals who are identical to Jack across a given range of situations, the view predicts that bare names are not susceptible to an attributive interpretation. Put another way, since rigidity is built into the semantics of bare names on the Quinean proposal, the absence of non-rigid, attributive interpretations is just what would be expected.

6.3 'One'-Anaphora

A third problem faced by Being-Called Predicativism, originally noted by King (2006), concerns 'one'-anaphora. Unmodified count-noun descriptions like 'the table' readily anchor such anaphora:

(43) We lost the table, but another one will arrive tomorrow.

Now if bare names were a variety of unmodified-count-noun description, one would expect that they should similarly be capable of anchoring 'one'-anaphora. Yet parallel examples with bare names sound infellicitous:

(44) * We lost Jack, but another one will arrive tomorrow.

Again, this disanalogy is unexpected on the Being-Called View. If 'Jack' is analyzed as a covert description involving a predicate synonymous with 'individual called "Jack"', one would expect 'one' to be capable of being anaphorically linked to that predicate, with the second conjunct receiving an interpretation along the lines of "another individual called 'Jack' will arrive tomorrow," just as the second conjunct in (43) is interpreted as "another table will arrive tomorrow." Or consider an example where the name does seem to function as a being-called predicate:

(45) We lost the Russell from Cambridge, but another one will arrive tomorrow.

Here the anaphoric 'one' is interpretable in terms of the preceding being-called predicate ("another Russell will arrive tomorrow"). The fact that this interpretation does not seem available in the case of bare referential names counts against Being-Called Predicativism.[18]

Quinean Predicativism, by contrast, can again offer an explanation for the disanalogy. For a 'one'-anaphora to be felicitous, it must evidently have a multiply-satisfiable predicate as antecedent. After all, the phrase 'another one' in the second conjunct serves to explicitly say that the thing referred to is of the same sort as, but distinct from, the thing referred to in the first conjunct. This requirement of multiple satisfiability for the anchoring predicate cannot be met on the Quinean analysis. On this view, the name 'Jack' in the first conjunct of (44) functions as a predicate that denotes the property of being identical to Jack. There cannot be *another* individual, someone who will arrive tomorrow and is distinct from Jack, who has this property. The Quinean thus has an explanation of the difference in felicity between (43) and (44), even if both involve descriptions with unmodified count nouns.

7 Conclusion

My aim in this paper has been to explore he prospects of a broadly Quinean approach to certain occurrences of names. I began with close appositives, and argued that names in these constructions plausibly function as predicates, but that they are better analyzed as expressing identifying properties of the Quinean sort than than the being-called properties predicative names express in other contexts. Next, I considered the possibility of extending this analysis to referential occurrences of names. According to this Quinean Predicativism, referential names also express identifying properties, and have an underlying structure similar to close appositives, except that the intervening sortal noun drops away and the definite article is (at least in English) realized covertly. As we saw, this

[18]Elbourne's (2005) hybrid view arguably also faces this difficulty. Since on his view the name itself just expresses a being-called property (with the identifying property contributed by a separate covert argument to the covert definite determiner), it isn't clear why the anaphoric 'one' should not be able to pick up on this being-called property, as it does in (45).

form of predicativism avoids a number of difficulties that confront Being-Called Predicativism, to do with rigidity, attributively distributed readings, and 'one'-anaphora.

Of course, the data a comprehensive theory of names ultimately has to account for do not end there. There are a wide range of additional issues that would have to be addressed, but which I will not be able to take up here. I will just briefly mention three of them. First, predicativists of every stripe need to explain why the definite article is realized covertly with referential names in English, when it is overt in other languages, and overt in English with ordinary count nouns, including, as Jeshion (2017) has pointed out, with unmodified being-called predicates. For example, if you tell me that you've invited a person to your party who is called 'Katherine', but whom I've never met before and have no other information about, I can felicitously ask:

(46) Where's the Katherine?

Why then must the definite article remain covert with ordinary referential names, if these are also predicates? A preliminary observation a Quinean might make here is that identifying predicates differ from other count nouns in that they are uniquely satisfiable, and indeed only satisfiable by particular individual. A such, they are as close to being semantically definite as a count noun could be. So if an article that ordinarily has the job of overtly signaling definiteness is going to be left covert somewhere, a bare identifying predicate would be about as good a candidate as could be found. Different languages take advantage of this potential for covertness to different degrees: Swiss German not at all, other varieties of German make it optional, and English requires it. But one would still like to know more about the nature of this requirement.[19]

Second, any theory of names needs to explain inference patterns involving referential names and being-called predicates, first noted by Hornsby (1976). For example, 'Frida Kahlo isn't here', which contains a referential name, is correctly inferable from 'There are no Fridas here', which contains a being-called predicate. Being-Called Predicativism of course has a ready explanation, since it analyzes referential names in terms of being-called predicates. Various proposals have, however, also been put forward on behalf of views that depart from Being-Called Predicativism in one way or another, and the Quinean Predicativist may well be able to adapt one of these for her purposes.[20] It should also be noted that such inferences are equally legitimate with close apposi-

[19]One option might be to pursue a version of Gray's (2017) two-determiner proposal (which in turn builds on Schwarz (2009)). Very roughly, he argues that English has two definite articles: a "strong" article that is used for discourse referents that are only available within the local conversational context, and a "weak" article that is used if the referent is cross-contextually available, and which is realized covertly in combination with names in English. Since Quinean identifying predicates would be ideally suited to refer to cross-contextually available referents, one would expect them to occur with Gray's weak article, which is covert.

[20]For some different proposals, see e.g. Hawthorne and Manley (2012); Leckie (2013); Rami (2015); Schoubye (2017). This issue is closely connected to another I have not addressed here, about the relationship between referential and various different predicative uses of names, besides being-called uses. See Jeshion (2015) for a nice taxonomy of

tives, for example:

(47) There are no Fridas here. So the artist Frida Kahlo isn't here

The Quinean could then perhaps just invoke the right of the piggybacker, and hold that whatever mechanism underwrites the inferences in the case of close appositives (which, as I've argued, do not involve being-called predicates) is also operative in the case of referential names.

Third, a comprehensive theory would have to say something about apparently bound occurrences of names, as in Geurts' (1997) famous example: 'If a child is christened 'Bambi', and Disney Inc. hear about it, they will sue Bambi's parents.' Examples like these have often been used as part of a motivation for a variabilist approach to names, as in e.g. Cumming (2008) and Schoubye (2017). Of course, there is no formal obstacle to treating names as assignment sensitive on the Quinean view as well, via a lexical entry of the following sort:

$$[\![\text{Quine}_i]\!]^g = \lambda x.x = g(i)$$

That said, bound uses of names are exceedingly rare, and their binding potential appears to be far more restricted than that of paradigm variables, so it isn't clear that this move towards assignment sensitivity is called for.

These cursory remarks are just a gesture towards some the issues that remain oustanding. A full dress defense of Quinean Predicativism would have address each of these points, and others besides, in much greater detail. I leave this for another occasion. My aim here has been more modest. What I hope to have shown is that a Quinean approach to certain occurrences of names can be empirically motivated, and that Quinean Predicativism about referential names is an option worthy of consideration, alongside its better-known competitors. In particular, some of the central arguments that have been raised against predicativism turn out not to undermine predicativism as such, once we take the Quinean variety into account.

a variety of predicative uses.

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